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Abstract: The aim of this study is to investigate the effects of the asymmetry, the political and
the cultural information on the budgetary participation and budgetary slack in the local
government. Population as well as a unit of analysis in this study are all local governments in
the province of South Sulawesi with 25 local authorities in the Local governance Work Unit
(SKPD) that make up the budget as much as 803 SKPD. The sampling technique used was
purposive sampling with the SKPD criteria that make up a complete budget in accordance with
performance-based budgeting format. The result show (1) the asymmetry information direct
effect affects the budgetary participation and the budgetary slack in the local government working
unit in South Sulawesi, (2) the politic has the direct effect on the budgeting participation in the
local government working unit in South Sulawesi, (3) the direct influence testing shows that
the culture impacts on the budgeting participation in the local government working unit in
South Sulawesi, and (4) the direct effect of budgetary participation influence on budgetary
slack in local government working unit in South Sulawesi
Keywords: Assymetry Information, Political, Cultural, Budgetary Particiaption, Budgetary
asymmetry, participation,
I. INTRODUCTION
Public sector budget is an accountability instrument for the management of public
funds and the implementation of the programs financed from the public money
(Mardiasmo, 2005: 61). Budgeting process involves the human interaction, so that
there are human behaviors that may arise as a result of the budget, both positive
and negative behaviors. A positive attitude can be an improvement of the manager
performance motivated by the budget used as the basis of their performance
appraisal. The negative behavior that may arise is the tendency of managers to
create slack in budgeting. The budgetary slack is defined by Young (1985) i.e. slack
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is the amount by roommates subordinate understate productive capability when
given his chance to select a standard work against the which his performance will
be evaluated. Thus the budgetary slack is the difference between the resources
required with the resources available to a job that can be used for the performance
assessment.
Budgetary slack is usually done by raising or lowering the fee revenue than
they should be, so that the budget is reached (Merchant, 1981). The tendency to
make the budget gap indirectly through the leader confidence development to
subordinates in the decision making about the performance the participatory
budgeting often happens. Subordinates are asked to determine a target that can be
achieved, which will be the basis for the assessment of organizational performances.
There are some phenomena due to the slack in the local government budget,
including the case below. There is a budget crisis. From the 491 districts/cities
and 33 provinces in Indonesia, 457 local governments got deficit in APBD 2013. It
increases from the previous year that only 447 areas were deficit budgeted (i.e. the
expenditure is greater than income). Having an identification stage in the budgeting
preparation, drawing up a budget which can be achieved is by increasing the costs
or degrading the revenue than necessary can be achieved. This situation is termed
to create the budgetary slack (Merchant, 1981).
The research result which is conducted by The Asian Foundation and the Fitra
National Secretariat indicates the Local Budget Management Performance in 2009
(KiPAD) is low due to the lack of public participation in the budgeting preparation,
causing by the budgetary slack. This phenomenon shows the indication of
budgetary slack. The phenomenon raises a new question, why the budgetary slack,
what causes it and how to mitigate them. The budgetary slack must be traced to
the factors that cause the budgetary slack. The deciding factors of the budgetary
slack are such as: the individuals capacity, the information asymmetry, the
budgetary participation, cultural, political and other factors (Young S. M, 1985).
This study takes variables of the participation, the information asymmetry,
the political and cultural as the variables that affect the budgetary slack. The
variables were chosen because the similar researches rarely use those variables.
Based on the above description, the purpose of this study is to explore the effects
of the interaction of the asymmetric information, political, cultural variables, either
directly or indirectly through the participation in determining the budgetary slack.
The result of this research is beneficial to: (a) the theoretical perspective, namely
the development of science in general and in particular in the sector of governance
public accounting, (b) the perspective of a methodology that can explore the
empirical effects of the interaction of the participation and budgetary slack that is
still rarely used for the study materials in Indonesia, especially in the South Sulawesi
local governments, (c) the operational or the implementation perspective for the
local governments which are becoming the ideas and the reference contribution in
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determining the operational policy relating to budgeting in ensuring good
governance. For the legislature, the result of this study can be a reference to
formulate a good pattern control for the improvement budget performance.
Based on these objectives, the formulation of the problem in this study is
formulated in the form of the following research questions. (1) Does the information
asymmetry affect the participation budgeting. (2) Does the information asymmetry
affect the budgetary slack? (3) Does the information asymmetry affect the budgetary
slack through budget participation? (4) Does the political participation influence
on the budget. (5) Does the politic influence on budgetary slack. (6) Does the politic
influence on budgetary slack through the budget participation. (7) Does the culture
affect the participation budgeting. (8) Does the culture influence on budgetary
slack. (9) Does the culture influence on the budgetary slack through the budget
participation. (10) Does the budgetary participation influence on budgetary slack.
II. LITERATURE
A. Agency Theory
The Agency theory. The agency theory is a concept which describes the contractual
relationship between the principals and agents. the principal party is the party
that gives the mandate to the other party, namely the agent, to carry out all the
activities on behalf of the principal, in his capacity as the decision makers (Jensen,
Michel C., and Meckling, William H (1976: 305). In this study, the agency approach
will be adopted to evaluate the factors that affect the budgetary slack.
The budgetary slack problems arise with the emergence of agency problems in
the budgetary process. The principal get the difficulty to ensure that the agent acts
to maximize the welfare of the principal. Agency relationships provide an
understanding of the behavior organizational with their maximum desire (Frost,
2003: 319). The efforts to maximize the desire to encourage conflict between the
principal and agent as each party seek to maximize its interests. The principal wants
the increasing performance, while the agents try to maximize the fulfillment through
the compensation received. It can bring the budgetary slack in the budget process.
The object under the study is the local government; there are two perspectives
that can be explored in the application of the agency theory, namely the relationship
or contract between the local government and the parliament as the principal agent.
The contract between the two groups is also likely to lead to conflict, because of
the different interests.
B. The budgetary Slack
The definition of the budgetary slack according to Siegel and Marconi (1989) is:
“Slack is difference between resources that are actually necessary to efficiently complete a
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task and the larger amount of resources that are earmarked for the task” “Budgetary slack
exist whenever a manager deliberately under estimates revenues or over estimates costs.
Either approach increases the like hood of the budget being achieved by the manager, and
consequently reduce the risk that manager also faces”. From the definition, it can be
concluded that the manager creates slack by estimating the lower income and the
higher costs; it is conducted in order to achieve the budget targets so that it gives
the good leadership impression. The reason of the subordinates do this slack is by
loading the safety margin in achieving the set targets. In this way, the subordinates
expect to eliminate the stress and frustration in efforts to achieve the budget targets
due to the tight budget.
C. Factors Affecting the Budgetary Slack
1. Budgetary Participation
Siegel and Marconi (1989) state that the participation in the budgeting process can
provide benefits, among others, (a) the people involved in the budgeting process
is not only having the task involved but also ego Involved in carrying out their
work; (b) a person’s participation will increase the sense of togetherness in the
group because it can improve the collaboration between the group members in
their targeting, but it can reduce the distress due to the budgeting; (c) reduce the
inequality in allocating the available resources among the divisions that exist within
the organization.
2. The asymmetric Information.
The asymmetric information is different between the lower level manager or middle
manager with the top management in budgeting. Managers may have more
knowledge than the subordinates/implementing the budget on the responsibility
of a subordinate unit/implementing the budget or vice versa. When the possibility
first occurred, there will be greater demands from superiors/holder budgetary
authority to subordinates/implementing the budget on the achievement of
budgetary targets which, according subordinates/executing the budget is too high.
However, when the possibility of a second case, a subordinate/implementing the
budget will be lower than the target stated that it is possible to achieve, which
ultimately create budgetary slack.
3. Politics
The budgeting in local government is one of the basic components of public policy
areas. The budget policy area is a political decision which formulated the Regional
Budget Drafting Team (TAPD) together with the Regional Representatives Council
(DPRD). As the political decisions, the budget policy is often through a political
process that is long and complex. Starting from the election in the village/sub-
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district to the stage of discussion in Parliament. These stages cannot be separated
from the political nuances, so the need to strive for, to be able to ensure that (a) the
budget allocation is the result of public choice/community, not as the result of a
choice group of people/certain groups; (b) the determination of choice over the
income component of the budget income and expenditure based on the technical
considerations and public rationality; (c) the regional budget policy to be defined
completely in accordance with the real conditions, potentials and aspirations of
the community; (e) and others.
4. The Culture
The organizational culture is a set of assumptions, beliefs, values and perceptions
owned by the members of the group of organizations that shape and influence the
attitudes and behavior of the group concerned (Hofstede, 1983). A strong culture
can shape compactness, loyalty and organizational commitment. A strong culture
can be adopted from the noble values of our nation that are familiar with the term
of the local knowledge. The local wisdom consists of two words, namely wisdom
and local. Wisdom means being wise and local means the place around. In other
words, local wisdom is the ideas, the values, and the views of the local that are
wise, full of wisdom, good value, embedded and followed by members of such
society. Therefore, the budgeting is based on the local knowledge is right. It is
because the local wisdom can dampen the various internal upheavals. For the
example, the selfishness for being assessed is good then creating the budgetary
slack. Local wisdom values which are exemplified in this study is the main value
of the local cultural wisdom community in South and West Sulawesi. Those values
are honesty/alempureng/lappu’, cleverness/amacangeng/manarang,
appropriateness/mappasitinaja/asitinajangan, firmness/agettangeng, business/
reso, shame/pride/siri (Rahim, 2011).
E. Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Steering
1. The Asymmetry Information, the Budgetary Participation and the Budgetary
Slack
The budget should be reported together with the expected performance. However,
because the subordinate information is better than the manager (there is the
asymmetry information), then the subordinates take the opportunity of the
budgetary participation. The subordinate provide the biased information from
their personal information, to make a budget that is relatively easy to achieve.
Such conditions lead to budgetary slack which is to report the performance below
the expected budget (Schiff and Lewin, 1970). This is confirmed by the research
conducted by Christensen (1982), which reveals that in the participation budgeting,
subordinates can hide some of their personal information, which could lead to
budgetary slack.
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2. The Politic, the Budgetary Participation and the Budgetary Slack.
The research result conducted by Mackic, V (2013) indicates the presence of politics
in the budget cycle that resulted in budget deficits in some local governments in
Croatia. The budget deficit indicates the budgetary slack. This is in line with the
statement of Khalid A., R and Deborah L., L (2012) which states that the process at
the local government budgeting laden with the political practices that can lead to
poor budget performance. In other words, poor budget performance is a sign of
budgetary slack.
3. Culture, the Budgetary Participation and the Budgetary Slack
Cultural influence on the budget process is shown by the findings of Wu, Eng C
(2005). A diverse culture can create their budgetary slack. In addition, the cultural
influence can have positive or negative impact of the work. It is in line with the
findings of Supomo (1998) which states that there is a positive influence on the
culture of the people-oriented organization and a negative influence on the
organizational culture which is oriented to work on the effectiveness of the
participatory budget in improving the managerial performance. Thus the high
culture (positive effect) would lead to the higher budgetary participation that will
minimize the budgetary slack.
4. The Budgetary Participation and the Budgetary slack
Some previous research has examined the relationship of the budgetary
participation and the budgetary slack from the standpoint of the agency perspective
(Baiman and Evans 1983). Participation generates greater chance of subordinates
to create the budgetary slack. The researcher refers to the opinion that the
participation of the budget will increase the budgetary slack (Dunk, 1993). The
argument put forward is that the higher the participation given to the subordinates,
the subordinates tend to be trying to keep the budget they set easily reached, one
way in which the budget is to loosen or create slack.
III. RESEARCH METHODS
Population as well as a unit of analysis in this study are all local governments in
the province of South Sulawesi with 25 local authorities in the Local governance
Work Unit (SKPD) that make up the budget as much as 803 SKPD. The sampling
technique used was purposive sampling with the SKPD criteria that make up a
complete budget in accordance with performance-based budgeting format. In
accordance with these criteria, the minimum sample required for 55 observation/
indicator is 5 x 55 = 275 SKPD to qualify a minimum sample of 5 for each group/
cell (Hair et al., 2006: 112). The researchers sent questionnaires to 300 copies, but
because respondents is good enough then a team of surveyors in the area of data
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collection adds to the questionnaire as much as 30 questionnaires. 21 questionnaires
aborted because of incomplete, so the questionnaire which can be used as many as
309 pieces. The number of reservations has fulfilled the samples using a
questionnaire. In accordance with the Hair, et al. (2006) that the sample size for the
study using questionnaires can range 100-400 samples. The data used in this study
are in the form of primary data. The collection of data is through the questionnaires
enclosed models. A data analysis technique starts by using the confirmatory factor
test for the validity testing and the construct reliability and Variance Extracted
(VE) for the reliability testing. The data can be categorized as valid if it has a loading
factor which is greater than 0.50 and if it has a value of data reliable construct
reliability which is greater than 0.70 (Hair, 2006: 779) and VE which is greater than
0.50 (Hair, et al, 2006). The next test is the test of causality between the variables
through modeling Generalized Structured Component Analysis (GSCA). The
research analyzed the independent variables/exogenous and dependent variables/
endogenous. The exogenous variables are the asymmetry of information, politics
and culture. The endogenous variables in this study are the budgetary participation
and the budgetary slack. The budget participation in this study serves as
moderating or intervening variables. The variables in this study are all latent
variables or the unobserved variables that cannot be measured directly; they can
only be estimated by the indicator. The scale of the research is the interval scale.
IV. THE RESULTS ACHIEVED
A. Test Research Instruments and Descriptive Analysis of the Characteristics
of Respondents
The validity and reliability testing results can be found in the Appendix 1. The
result shows that all the variables valid and reliable so that it can be continued on
subsequent testing. Appendix 2 shows the dominant respondents were male
(90.3%) as a constituent element of the budget in the provincial and district / city
in South Sulawesi. This condition indicates that the mobility of male over-budgeting
positioned as a more requires expertise projection strategy. Women as a supporting
service or companion services are better suited to the operational managerial
organization. Appendix 2 shows that respondents which are most widely sampled
in this study are aged 45-56 years old as many as 274 respondents (88.7%). This
indicates that respondents are already quite mature in terms of participating in
drafting the budget.
Appendix 2 shows most of participants have the educational levels of post
graduated (S2) that is equal to 71.2%. The remaining, 27.2% of them having the
educational background of under graduate (S1) and even there are 5 of them (1.6%)
have the educational background of doctorate degree (S3). This gives an indication
that the aspect of education at the local government level has been very good. At
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the level of the budget breastfeeding majority filled by educated scholars continued.
These results indicate that HR policies in the local government area of South
Sulawesi province receive attention so as to be able to be the Drafting Team and
Supervisory Regional Budget (TPPAD) concerned has to meet certain criteria
including adequate levels of education. In addition to a good education level of
the respondents of this study, it is expected that they can better understand all the
items questions / statements in the questionnaire given. Based on the period of
employment of civil servants, most of the answer has been a civil servant for 20-29
years (63.1%). This indicates that respondents are already quite mature in terms of
technical work and budgeting skills. In addition, civil servants with tenure on
average 20-29 years, they are expected to understand the problems posed in the
questionnaire given.
D. Inferential statistical analysis
Inferential statistical analysis used in this data analysis study is GESCA. Tests
were carried out is the assumption of linearity, goodness of fit, the outer model.
The linearity assumption testing examines the relationship between the latent
variables in the structural model which is linear. The test aims to determine does
it use the linear model. The test is conducted with the assumption of linearity
curve fit method with the results in the Appendix 3. The reference used is the
principle of parsimony, which is when the entire model used as the basis for testing
is significant or non significant, it means the model cab be categorized as linear.
The specification of the model used as the basis for testing is a model of linear,
quadratic, cubic, inverse, logarithmic, power, compound, and exponential growth.
The Appendix 3 shows that all the influences produce a significant linear model
(linear model sig <0.05), so that the linearity assumptions are met. Thus the analysis
can be further performed. The goodness of fit testing result shows a good model,
as in the Appendix 4. Thus, the Generalized Model of Structural Component
Analysis (GSCA) in this study fit and can be used, so that the interpretation can be
conducted for the further discussion. Likewise, the measurement model testing or
the Outer models testing show the results of all the dimensions that make up the
variable is significant (Appendix 5).
E. Structural Model
Hypothesis testing is done by the direct influence of the t test (t test) on each lane
partial effect. There are two types of influence in GSCA, namely (1) direct effect,
and (2) the indirect effect. The test results are in the Appendix 6 and 7.
1. Direct Effect Analysis
The analysis result of a direct impact on the budgetary participation shows that
the coefficient of direct political influence on budgetary participation is 0.290. The
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result is greater than the direct effects of the asymmetry information coefficient of
the budgetary participation of -0362 and the coefficient of direct cultural influence
on the budgetary participation as it is 0.278. Thus, it can be concluded that politic
has the stronger influence on budgetary participation than the asymmetry
information and culture.
The analysis result of the direct influence on budgetary slack indicates that the
direct effect coefficient of the asymmetry information on the budgetary slack is
0.358. The result is greater than the coefficient of direct political influence on the
budgetary slack as it is -0.061 and the coefficient of direct cultural influence on
budgetary slack at -0.072 and the coefficient of direct influence of budgetary
participation on budgetary slack at -0.072.
2. Analysis of Indirect Influence
The analysis result of the indirect effect of asymmetry information on the budgetary
slack through the budgeting participation indicates a coefficient of 0.098. The result
is greater than the coefficient of indirect political influence on the budgetary slack
through the budgetary participation which shows the coefficient of -0079 and
indirect influence of culture on budgetary slack through the budgetary participation
which indicates a coefficient of -0.076. Thus, it can be concluded that the asymmetry
information in the mediation by a stronger budgetary participation which
influences on the budgetary slack than the political mediation by the budgetary
participation and cultural mediation by budget participation.
F. Discussion of Results
1. The test result shows that the asymmetry information direct effect affects the
budgetary participation and the budgetary slack in the local government working
unit in South Sulawesi. Likewise, the indirect influence shows the result of the
asymmetry information affects the budgetary slack through the budgetary
participation. Thus, the hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 are supported as they are empirically
proven.
This finding is consistent with the research conducted by Almeide de Faria, J.
and Gomes da Silva, SM (2013). Their research findings confirm that the asymmetry
information led to high budgetary slack either at the time to participate or not
participate in preparing the budget. The research conducted by Almeide de Faria,
J. and Gomes da Silva, SM (2013) applies the experimental methods and it supports
the Agency Theory. Likewise, the result of this study supports the agency theory
that in this case, the agent is the staff working on the budget have better information
than the leaders. That situation may bring shrinking, namely the efforts made
subordinate to hide information in its possession (Brahmayanti and Sholihin, 2006:
177).
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The significance of the result supports the research suggested by Schiff and
Lewin, 1970. The research states that a subordinate is likely to provide biased
information and create a budget that is easily reached, triggering the emergence
of budgetary slack. In addition the result of this study is in accordance with the
findings of research conducted by Christensen (1982). The research result states
that in the participating of the preparing the budget, the subordinates hide some
of their personal information, which could lead to the budgetary slack. Likewise,
the result of this study shows that the subordinates have better information than
the managers. The situation led to a subordinate provides bias that make it easily
accessible trigger the budgetary slack.
The findings of this study support the research conducted by Lavarda, F. et al
(2013). His researches verify the effect of budgetary participation on reducing the
asymmetry information in the budgeting process in a multinational company. To
reduce the asymmetry information set budget targets. However, the finding
indicates that the businesses do not reduce the asymmetry information in
participating of preparing the budget. Likewise with this research, the result of
this study shows that the subordinates’ information is better than the managers’
(there is asymmetry information), then the subordinates take the opportunity to
participate in the budgeting preparation.
2. The testing result shows that the politic has the direct effect on the budgeting
participation in the local government working unit in South Sulawesi. Likewise,
the indirect effect shows the results of politic has influence on the budgetary slack
through the budgeting participation. Thus, hypothesis 4 and 6 are supported as
they are empirically proven. Moreover, the hypothesis 5 is unsupported, it is proven
by the results of the study which shows that politic does not have significant
influence on the budgetary slack
The result of the study (hypothesis 4) supports the research of Mackic, V (2013),
which shows a political budget cycle or the budgeting process. Likewise, the result
of this study indicates the existence of a political relationship with the budgeting
participation. This result is supported by the result of the high respondents rating
on the political variables. The result is justified because budgeting is closely related
to the politics which involves the bargaining between the various forces that have
the authority to determine which one is important and which is not (budgeting is
the power and politics). Bargaining can be done by participating in budgeting
preparation, so these results are very reasonable. This is consistent with the views
of Aristotle (384-322 BC) on politics as he states that politics is a natural and
unavoidable in human life, including in preparing the budget.
The result of this study (hypothesis 5) does not support the research of
Haryanto, Mushar and Haliah (2013) which states politics affects the budgetary
performance. The result shows that politic does not affect the performance of the
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budget in this respect budgetary slack. Thus the political aspects will add diversity
to improve the performance of the budget considerations include avoiding the
budgetary slack. The result of this study (hypothesis 6) supports the research
conducted by Khalid A., R and Deborah L., L (2012); Haryanto, Kartini and Haliah
(2013); and Haliah, Muallimin and Nirvana (2014). Their results state that there
are significant political dimension to the process of participatory budgeting and
the budgetary performance. Likewise, the result of this study demonstrates the
political relations with budgetary slack(budgetary performance) through the
budgeting participation . This is reasonable because the budgeting in the local
government process laden with political nuances that can lead to poor budget
performance. In other words, poor budget performance is a sign of budgetary slack.
The fact that often arises is the political with the budgeting nuance the budget
drafted did not reflect the scale of priorities, tend redundant, carelessly, what
matters is the program has been implemented and the budget has been absorbed.
3. The result of the direct influence testing shows that the culture impacts on
the budgeting participation in the local government working unit in South
Sulawesi. Likewise, the indirect influence shows the results of the culture impacts
on the budgetary slack through the budgeting participation. Thus, the hypothesis
7 and 9 are supported because they are empirically proven. Meanwhile, the
hypothesis 8 is not supported, it is proved by the results of the study where the
culture has insignificant influence on budgetary slack
The result of the study (hypothesis 7) supports the findings of Wu, Eng C (2005)
which states that there are cultural influences in the budget process. Likewise, the
result of this study shows a positive relationship with the culture budgeting
participation. The result supports the revelation of Hofstede (1983) about the
culture, he expresses that a strong culture (positive) may establish cohesiveness,
loyalty and commitment to the organization, including the wisdom of local culture.
The culture of local knowledge can enhance budgeting participation. Local wisdom
culture is positive in the preparation of the budgeting need to be appointed as the
nation’s wealth. Local wisdom culture contains the noble values that are relevant
and useful for the needs of the general public. Thus the preparation of the budgeting
is based on a high cultural wisdom has been very good.
The result of this research is the hypothesis 8 as it is said that the culture has
insignificant influence on budgetary slack is strengthen by the result of the research
conducted by Kanan, R. and Mula, JM (2015). The research result indicates that
the individual and collective culture does not lead to budgetary slack in the oil
company in Saudi Arabia. The implication is that the oil company can work together
with countries that have different cultures. Likewise, the result of this research,
South Sulawesi local culture does not create slack, so that the various participants
from different cultures can participate in drawing up a good budget.
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The results of this study (hypothesis 9) supports the research conducted by
Supomo (1998) which states that there is a positive influence on the culture of a
people-oriented organization and a negative influence on culture-oriented
organization in working on the effectiveness of the participatory budget in the
improved performance. Likewise, this study found a negative effect of cultural
influences on budgetary slack through the budgeting participation. The higher
the culture, the smaller budgetary slack will be if it done through the budgeting
participation. These results are supported by respondents’ assessment on the local
culture by giving a high value. The culture of local knowledge is scholarly or
amacangeng value, honesty or allempureng, firmness or agettangeng, decency or
asitinajangan, business or reso, shame or pride or series (Rahim, 2011). These values
as part of the culture of local knowledge in the preparation of the budget need to
be appointed as the nation’s wealth. Local wisdom culture contains the noble values
that are relevant and useful for the needs of the general public. Thus budgeting
based cultural wisdom is right.
4. The test results show that the direct effect of budgetary participation influence
on budgetary slack in local government working unit in South Sulawesi. Thus, the
hypothesis 10 is empirically supported as it is proven. The result supports the
research which is conducted by Su, Chin-Chun and Ni, Feng-Yu (2013). The result
of research states that there is a relationship between the budgeting participation
with the budgetary slack by using the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). Likewise,
the result of this study states that there is a relationship between the budgeting
participation with the budgetary slack. They only have a negative relationship. It
means that the higher participation budgeting, the lower budgetary slack will be.
The result of this study supports the agency theory and the research results
conducted by Baiaman and Evans (1983) which states that if the subordinates are
given a greater opportunity to participate, they will create the budgetary slack.
Likewise, the result of this study indicates the level of involvement of the
respondents’ assessment results showed the highest yield among the indicators of
participation. This result indicates that the most important thing in budgeting
preparation is the level of involvement (Tudang Sipulung). It is possible because
the budgeting process is through a few processes or phases. At each stage, it is
required a high level of involvement that what is fought in the determination of
the budget can be achieved. If in a stage there is a low level of involvement, the
possibility of getting unsuccessful is accommodated in budgeting.
The result of this study support the statement of Siegel and Marconi (1989)
which states that participation in the budgeting process can provide benefits such
as: participation of a person will increase the sense of togetherness in the group
because it can improve collaboration between group members in targeting them,
but it can relieve depressed due to the budgeting. Likewise, the results of the study
gives the high marks to the participation in Bugis language termed Tudang
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Sipulung. Tudang Sipulung, can provide the value of togetherness and sense of
belonging. Tudang Sipulung in budgeting will lead the initiative for them to
contribute ideas and information, enhance unity, and a sense of belonging, so that
cooperation between members in achieving the goals also increased. However, if
it is not implemented properly, the involvement can encourage subordinates to
do slack (Utomo 2006 in Ompusunggu and Bawono, 2006: 2).
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The conclusions of this research are (1) the asymmetry information direct effect
affects the budgetary participation and the budgetary slack in the local government
working unit in South Sulawesi, (2) the politic has the direct effect on the budgeting
participation in the local government working unit in South Sulawesi, (3) the direct
influence testing shows that the culture impacts on the budgeting participation in
the local government working unit in South Sulawes, and (4) the direct effect of
budgetary participation influence on budgetary slack in local government working
unit in South Sulawesi.
The limitation of this study: The independent variables included in this study
are limited. Not all the issues are the trend topics related to the budgetary slack
and budgeting participation. The evident from the results of this study, there are
54% of other variables that influence the budgeting participation and 48.1% of
other variables that affect the budgetary slack.
The recommendations of this research are (1) In accordance with the result of
the data and models testing, it shows a good result and is advisable to establish
TPPAD in local government with 20-29 years- work experienced staff, having the
educational background of post graduate, and prioritizing men. It is intended that
the level of experience and educational, TPPAD will be able to understand well
the problems in budgeting area because TPPAD are quite mature, experienced
and supported by a good level of education. By the good understanding of the
problem in budgeting area, it is expected to be able to support the rights of society
as it is reflected in the budgeting area, (2) Based on the result of the hypothesis 1,
4 and 7 testing, it is suggested to increase the budget and it needs to maximize the
participation and political culture. However, the asymmetry information needs to
be minimized to increase the budget participation, (3) Based on the results of the
hypotheses 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 testing, it is suggested to minimize the budgetary
slack and the asymmetry information need to be eliminated. In contrast with the
budgetary participation, it needs to be improved. Likewise, the politics and culture
need to be increased if the budget is done through participation. However, if the
budget is not conducted through the participation, the culture and politics will
not create the budgetary slack, so it does not need to be reduced or increased.
Open up the opportunities for further research because the result shows some
other variables that affect the budgeting participation and the budgetary slack.
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The goal is to find out more detail variables which affect the budgeting participation
and the budgetary slack.
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Appendix 1
The result of validity test
Variable Reliability Conclusion Dimension Item Validities Conclusion
Information X1.1 0.475 Valid
Asymmetric 0.671 Reliable X1.2 0.316 Valid
(X1) X1.3 0.465 Valid
X1.4 0.422 Valid
X1.5 0.557 Valid
Politic (X2) 0.617 Reliable X2.1 0.494 Valid
X2.2 0.334 Valid
X2.3 0.414 Valid
X2.4 0.310 Valid
X2.5 0.576 Valid
Culture (X3) 0.717 Reliable Intellectualization X3.1.1. 0.342 Valid
(X3.1) X3.1.2. 0.237 Not Valid
X3.1.3. 0.323 Valid
X3.1.4. 0.135 Not Valid
X3.1.5 0.204 Not Valid
Honesty/lempu X3.2.1 0.145 Not Valid
(X3.2) X3.2.2 0.311 Valid
X3.2.3 0.382 Valid
X3.2.4 0.364 Valid
X3.2.5 0.306 Valid
Firmness/ X3.3.1 0.157 Not Valid
agettangeng X3.3.2 0.320 Valid
(X3.3) X3.3.3 0.187 Not Valid
X3.3.4 0.392 Valid
X3.3.5 0.320 Valid
Decency / X3.4.1 0.346 Valid
assitinajangan X3.4.2 0.329 Valid
(X3.4) X3.4.3 0.130 Not Valid
X3.4.4 0.011 Not Valid
X3.4.5 0.328 Valid
Effort/reso X3.5.1 0.371 Valid
(X3.5) X3.5.2 0.335 Valid
X3.5.3 0.304 Valid
X3.5.4 0.492 Valid
X3.5.5 0.483 Valid
Shame/ pride/ X3.6.1 0.360 Valid
siri (X3.6) X3.6.2 0.013 Not Valid
X3.6.3 0.363 Valid
X3.6.4 0.122 Not Valid
X3.6.5 0.155 Not Valid
contd. appendix 1
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Participation Level of Y1.1.1 0.558 Valid
Budgeting 0.608 Reliable involvement Y1.1.2 0.422 Valid
(Y1) (Y1.1) Y1.1.3 0.604 Valid
Y1.1.4 0.456 Valid
Y1.1.5 0.574 Valid
Benefit Y1.2.1 0.445 Valid
involvement Y1.2.2 0.439 Valid
(Y1.2) Y1.2.3 0.423 Valid
Y1.2.4 0.394 Valid
Y1.2.5 0.416 Valid
Slack 0.708 Reliable Y2.1 0.507 Valid
Budget (Y2) Y2.2 0.365 Valid
Y2.3 0.310 Valid
Y2.4 0.365 Valid
Y2.5 0.506 Valid
Source:primary data were processed (2015)
Appendix 2
Characteristics of Respondents
Characteristics Criteria Frequency Percentage
Gender Male 279 90.3
  Female 30 9.7
Age < 45 years 28 9.1
  45-56 years 274 88.7
  > 56 years 7 2.3
Education S1 84 27.2
  S2 220 71.2
S3 5 1.6
Years of service 10-19 years 76 24.6
  20-29 years 195 63.1
  > 30 years 38 12.3
Source:primary data were processed (2015)
Appendix 3
The results of testing the assumption of linearity
Relationship between Variables Testing Results Explanation
X1 -> Y1 Sig Linear Model 0.000 < 0.05 Linear
X2 -> Y1 Sig Linear Model 0.004 < 0.05 Linear
X3 -> Y1 Sig Linear Model 0.000 < 0.05 Linear
X1 -> Y2 Sig Linear Model 0.017 < 0.05 Linear
X2 -> Y2 Sig Linear Model 0.020 < 0.05 Linear
X3 -> Y2 Sig Linear Model 0.000 < 0.05 Linear
Y1 -> Y2 Sig Linear Model 0.000 < 0.05 Linear
Source:primary data were processed (2015)
Variable Reliability Conclusion Dimension Item Validities Conclusion
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Appendix 4
The test results Goodness of Fit
Criteria Cut-of value Results Model Explanation
FIT � 0.50 0.729 Fit
AFIT � 0.50 0.711 Fit
GFI � 0.90 0.910 Fit
SRMR � 0.08 0.053 Fit
Source:primary data were processed (2015)
Appendix 5
Results of testing the measurement model or outer models
Indicator Coefficient CR P Conclusion
X1.1 0.576 2.75 0.006 Significant
X1.2 0.546 2.73 0.006 Significant
X1.3 0.592 3.23 0.001 Significant
X1.4 0.574 2.54 0.011 Significant
X1.5 0.571 3.04 0.002 Significant
X2.1 0.591 2.97 0.003 Significant
X2.2 0.566 2.75 0.006 Significant
X2.3 0.520 2.33 0.020 Significant
X2.4 0.638 3.20 0.001 Significant
X2.5 0.601 3.20 0.001 Significant
First Order        
X3.1 0.611 3.07 0.002 Significant
X3.2 0.536 2.68 0.007 Significant
X3.3 0.524 2.33 0.020 Significant
X3.4 0.572 3.06 0.002 Significant
X3.5 0.581 2.77 0.006 Significant
X3.6 0.529 2.64 0.008 Significant
Second Order X3.1        
X3.1.1 0.589 3.15 0.002 Significant
X3.1.3 0.615 3.17 0.002 Significant
Second Order X3.2        
X3.2.2 0.555 2.48 0.013 Significant
X3.2.3 0.622 2.88 0.004 Significant
X3.2.4 0.556 2.54 0.011 Significant
X3.2.5 0.639 2.85 0.004 Significant
Second Order X3.3        
X3.3.2 0.570 3.12 0.002 Significant
contd. appendix 1
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X3.3.4 0.536 2.41 0.016 Significant
X3.3.5 0.543 2.83 0.005 Significant
Second Order X3.4        
X3.4.1 0.517 2.75 0.006 Significant
X3.4.2 0.649 2.90 0.004 Significant
X3.4.5 0.501 2.44 0.015 Significant
Second Order X3.5        
X3.5.1 0.568 3.03 0.002 Significant
X3.5.2 0.638 3.24 0.001 Significant
X3.5.3 0.539 2.82 0.005 Significant
X3.5.4 0.603 2.73 0.006 Significant
X3.5.5 0.525 2.44 0.015 Significant
Second Order X3.6        
X3.6.1 0.553 2.42 0.016 Significant
X3.6.3 0.520 2.77 0.006 Significant
First Order        
Y1.1 0.606 2.91 0.004 Significant
Y1.2 0.509 2.28 0.023 Significant
Second Order Y1.1        
Y1.1.1 0.592 2.87 0.004 Significant
Y1.1.2 0.614 3.01 0.003 Significant
Y1.1.3 0.504 2.78 0.005 Significant
Y1.1.4 0.636 3.30 0.001 Significant
Y1.1.5 0.560 2.85 0.004 Significant
Second Order Y1.1        
Y1.2.1 0.537 2.77 0.006 Significant
Y1.2.2 0.572 2.74 0.006 Significant
Y1.2.3 0.526 2.31 0.021 Significant
Y1.2.4 0.553 2.76 0.006 Significant
Y1.2.5 0.546 2.64 0.008 Significant
Indicator Coefficient CR P Conclusion
Y2.1 0.556 2.48 0.013 Significant
Y2.2 0.614 3.28 0.001 Significant
Y2.3 0.503 2.28 0.023 Significant
Y2.4 0.522 2.31 0.021 Significant
Y2.5 0.524 2.61 0.009 Significant
Source:primary data were processed (2015)
Indicator Coefficient CR P Conclusion
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Appendix 6
The test results GSCA in structural models for testing hypotheses direct effect
No. Hypothesis Correlation Coefficient CR P Conclusion
1 Hypothesis 1 Information Asymmetric
(X1) � Participation - 0.362 3.65 0.000 Significant
Budgeting (Y1)
2 Hypothesis 2 Information Asymmetric 0.358 3.06 0.002 Significant
(X1) � Slack Budget
(Y2)
3 Hypothesis 4 Politic (X2) � 0.290 2.41 0.016 Significant
Participation Budgeting
(Y1)
4 Hypothesis 5 Politic (X2) � Slack -0.061 0.52 0.603 Non
Budget (Y2) Significant
5 Hypothesis 7 Culture (X3) � 0.278 2.43 0.015 Significant
Participation
Budgeting (Y1)
6 Hypothesis 8 Culture (X3) � Slack -0.072 0.90 0.368 Non
Budget (Y2) Significant
7 Hypothesis 10 Participation -0.272 3.00 0.003 Significant
Budgeting (Y1) �
Slack Budget (Y2)
Source:primary data were processed (2015)
Declared significant if the value CR > 1.96 atau P < 0.05
Appendix 7
The test results GSCA in structural models for testing hypotheses indirect effect
No Hypothesis Correlation Coefficient Conclusion
1 Hypothesis 3 Information Asymmetric
(X1)� Participation (-0.362) X Significant, because of
Budgeting (Y1)� (-0.272) = 0.098 the direct effect
Slack Budget (Y2)  X1 � Y1 Significant,
and Y1 � Y2
Significant
2 Hypothesis 6 Politic (X2) � Participation (0.290) X Significant, because of
Budgeting (Y1) � (-0.272) = the direct effect
Slack Budget (Y2) (-0.079) X2 � Y1 Significant,
and Y1 � Y2 Significant
3 Hypothesis 9 Culture (X3) � (0.278) X Significant, because
Participation Budgeting (-0.272) = of the direct effect
(Y1) � Slack Budget (-0.076) X3 � Y1 Significant,
(Y2)   and Y1 � Y2 Significant
Source:primary data were processed (2015)
